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BEYOND ROE AND DOE: THE RIGHTS OF THE FATHER
Howard Sherain*
I. Introduction
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v.
Wade' and Doe v. Boltom. These two cases, establishing a woman's legal right to
an abortion, have stirred much response and analysis, some in support of the
decisions3 and some quite critical of them. The criticism divides between the
"right to life" critics who consider those decisions incorrect on moral grounds4
and those who think the Court reached the correct decision but in a sloppy, over-
reaching, and dangerous manner.5
This commentary will not add to this critical analysis of the two decisions
but rather will look beyond Roe and Doe to a problem which is likely to arise in
the future' and is left unsolved by both cases. The problem is the extent of the
biological father's rights with regard to the abortion decision. If the mother
wants to obtain an abortion but the father wants the fetus to come to term, how
is the dispute resolved?'
The attempt here is not to argue that an abortion should be allowed to take
place only with the father's consent. However, just as the mother has certain
legal rights with regard to the abortion decision, so too does the father. Funda-
mental notions of equal protection compel the conclusion that, if there is disagree-
ment between father and mother with regard to the abortion decision, the decision
of the mother should not be absolutely decisive. Secondly, fundamental notions
of procedural due process compel the conclusion that if the father acts promptly,
he must be afforded the opportunity to an immediate hearing before a board
which would weigh the interests and burdens asserted by the father and mother.
II. Roe and Doe: The Mother's Right of Privacy
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton deal with the rights of the mother as against
* Associate Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long Beach.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3 E.g., Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
4 E.g., Pastoral Message of the Administrative Committee, National Conference of Cath-
olic Bishops, 19 CATHOLIC LAWYER 29 (1973).
5 E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALB L.J. 920
(1973); Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
R.v. 1 (1973). See generally Note, Abortion after Roe and Doe: A Proposed Statute, 26
VANP. L. REV. 823, 8 U. RIcHMOND L. REv. 75 (1973); 30 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 628
(1973); 10 GA. ST. B.J. 153 (1973); 2 Am. J. CRim. L. 231 (1973).
6 This expectation is also noted in Tribe, supra note 5, at 40.
7 In what follows, the words "father" and "mother," rather than "potential father" and
"potential mother," are used merely as shorthand. For reasons which should become clear as
this commentary proceeds, "father" is preferred to the narrower and unfeeling "fertilizer."
[That term was suggested by Mr. Roy Lucas in his (undated) letter to this writer. Mr. Lucas
was attorney for Miss Coe in Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), discussed at
note 91 infra].
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the state. The facts of neither case raised the issue of the rights of the father and
Roe's footnote 67' explicitly reserves judgment on this issue:
Neither in this opinion nor in [Doe], do we discuss the father's rights,
if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No pa-
ternal right has been asserted in either of the cases, and the Texas and
the Georgia statutes on their face take no cognizance of the father. We are
aware that some statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances.
North Carolina, for example . .. requires written permission for the abor-
tion from the husband when the woman is a married minor, that is, when
she is less than 18 years of age.... [Ijf the woman is an unmarried minor,
written permission from the parents is required. We need not now decide
whether provisions of this kind are constitutional.9
This is not to say, however, that Roe offers no guidance whatsoever. The reason-
ing in Roe and Doe will aid in the analysis of the right of the father.
Roe and Doe note that a woman's right to an abortion rests on the constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy. While Roe states that the right of privacy is
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy,"'' neither case precisely defines that right nor articulates its scope.
The right of privacy is a broad concept and there are perhaps four possible
ways in which it could apply to Roe and Doe. There would be a privacy pro-
tecting the intimacies of motherhood and childbearing,11 a privacy needed to
protect the relationship of mother and child. However, since the decisions in
Roe and Doe protect the woman's decision to abort-precisely the decision not
to establish the relationship of mother and child--surely that relationship cannot
easily be the basis for Roe's privacy. A second possible interpretation is that Roe
relies on a concept of "family-unit privacy." 2 A third possibility is a need for
privacy to protect the special intimacy of the sexual relation."
While different, these three possibilities have a common element: privacy
occasioned not by a location but by a relationship. As Justice Brennan put it in
his dissent in a recent obscenity case, if privacy extends to the doctor's office, the
hospital, and the hotel room, it is not because there is something sacrosanct about
these places but because, at that moment, they are the location of something
particularly personal, perhaps intimate.'4 A similar conclusion is reached with a
different approach to the matter. The privacy in Roe may be based upon the
sexual relation privacy of Griswold v. Connecticut,'5 which stems from the right
of associational privacy of NAACP v. Alabar.' The right of privacy recog-
nized in NAACP and in Griswold protects individuals against intrusion by the
8 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
9 Id. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 38.
10 410 U.S. at 153.
11 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
12 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
13 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
14 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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state; it is not a right to serve as a fence between and among individuals. Roe
identifies its right of privacy as personal, but so was Griswold's and NAACP's;
the right is personal in that it could be asserted by and is intended to protect
individual persons. Roe does not equate personal with exclusive.
Finally, the fourth possibility is that the Roe right of privacy differs from
the above cases and is called forth by "location"; 7 that is, Roe may stand for the
right of bodily privacy. This theory would rest on the premise that a woman,
or she and her doctor, have a right to decide what goes on inside her body.
Simply, a woman has a right "to determine her own reproductive life."'
The first suggestion of a right of bodily privacy occurs as dictum in a nine-
teenth-century railroad case. The Court wrote in Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law. As well said by judge Cooley "The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immty: to be let
alone."' 9
Does that mean that the law will not permit intrusions into or extrusions from the
human body without that individual's consent? Are we dealing with-to use
Judge Cooley's phrase-"a right of complete immunity"?
Cases such as Skinner u. Oklahoma 9' and Rochin v. Californida' suggest that
government intrusion into the body is disfavored. However, no case stands for
the principle that bodily privacy somehow holds a preferred position in the area
of protected privacy. The state has been upheld in its program of compulsory
vaccinations in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,"2 in its foray into eugenics in Buck v.
Bell," and in its involuntary blood-test search for criminal evidence in Schmerber
v. California.24 No right of bodily privacy was held to prevent a private hospital
from performing a blood transfusion to a fetus over the strong religious objections
of the mother.25 The argument for an absolute right to bodily privacy has been
forcefully made but has never won. The claim was made in an amicus brief in
Roe and the Court responded:
17 This is the approach in, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374-84 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
18 P"ESIDENT'S TASK FoRcs- REPORT ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 31 (1968), quoted in
Tribe, supra note 5, at 39.
19 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
20 316 U.S. 535, 544-46 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
22 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
23 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
24 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). See also Application of President & Directors of George-
town College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 890 (1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); In re Estate




The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amnici that one has an un-
limited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The
Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past
... this right is not unqualified .... 26
Thus, a right of bodily privacy is only relative. Since the matter involves a
woman's fundamental right to her bodily privacy, the woman's decision with
regard to that matter must prevail, unless there is a compelling concern out-
balancing her interests.2 Roe seems to suggest that an initial presumption must
be made in the woman's favor; but it is not an irrebuttable presumption.28 The
father may also have interests and thus must be given a chance to rebut.
This commentary will propose that, while the law's refusal to sanction the
mother's decision to abort may, in some circumstances, be a denial of her con-
stitutionally protected rights, the granting of the sanction may be a denial of the
father's constitutionally protected rights. Roe's reference to the qualified right of
the woman and its explicit reservation in footnote 67 leaves open the inquiry as
to the father's rights.
III. Stanley v. Illinois: The Disestablishment of the Sexual Stereotype
Two recent emphases in the law have been the increased development of a
right of privacy and an expanded recognition of women's rights. Two other
recent emphases have been the principle that substantial benefits cannot be taken
away without a hearing and the broad effort to end sexual discrimination. While
Roe ties together the first two trends, Stanley v. Illinois" joins the second two.
Before Stanley, the father had no legal rights." Breaking with centuries of
traditional civil and common law,3' Stanley held that it was unconstitutional to
disregard the claims and interests of the father in his attempt to retain custody
of his illegitimate child. If he promptly steps forward and acknowledges pater-
nity, 2 Stanley guarantees him a hearing and, through that hearing, the possibility
of retaining custody of the child against the attempt of the state to take custody.
Moreover, Stanley not only recognizes rights of the father but establishes them as
26 410 U.S. at 154.
27 Id. at 155-56. See also Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 3, at 768 n.21; 41 FoaD. L.
REV. 703, 712 (1973).
28 The "bad flavor" of "irrebuttable presumptions" is indicated in Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) ; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) ; Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965).
29 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
30 Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in
Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973); see generally Means, The Law of New York Con-
cerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitu-
tionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
31 Actually, a few courageous state courts had begun the change some years prior to
Stanley- See In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan, 270
Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965); In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731 (1963);
In re Aronson, 263 Wis. 604, 58 N.W.2d 553 (1953).
32 For varying state interpretations of this element of Stanley, see Comment, supra note 30,
at 132-34.
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fundamental rights.3 The same precedents relied upon to articulate the funda-
mental character of the right in Roe are followed in Stanley. 4
Because it is a fundamental right, it cannot be summarily and stereotypically
disposed of by the state. It may be, the Court reasoned, that the Illinois image
of illegitimate fathers as unconcerned and uncaring towards their children is
usually correct; it may also be that Mr. Stanley fits that model and should, there-
fore, have his children placed in other hands.3 5 Yet, it may also be that he is an
exception; and, since the issue concerned a fundamental right, the Court found
Illinois' assumption to be unconstitutional. Mr. Stanley had to be provided the
opportunity to show that he does not fit the stereotype, is a "fit" parent, and
ought to be allowed to keep his children.
The Stanley decision was not novel in this emphasis. It is the requirement of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act with regard to hiring. It was required in
Reed v. Reed36 in selecting an administrator for an estate. Its omission was the
error in the Cleveland Board of Education's maternity leave policy 7 and in the
Air Force's distribution of benefits on the basis of sex.s" The emphasis of Stanley,
then, is no legal aberration; it is a logical step." This commentary attempts to
point the way to the next logical step: If it is unconstitutional to prefer, auto-
matically and without a hearing, the state's claim to custody over the father's
claim, the same fundamental right principle may mean that it is unconstitutional
to prefer, automatically and without a hearing, the mother's claim to custody
over the father's claim. If the Constitution compels us to reject the legitimacy
stereotype' in favor of individual determinations in the one case, on what
grounds can it be argued that it does not compel us to reject the sexual stereotype
and require individual determinations in the other case?
The memorandum decisions in the wake of Stanley support this conclusion.
In Vanderlaan. v. Vanderlaan4 both the mother and the father sought custody
of the illegitimate child. The Illinois court summarily ruled for the mother. De-
spite the fact that Stanley only dealt with the father's right against the claims of
the state while Vanderlaan dealt with his right against the claims of the mother,
the Supreme Court explicitly vacated Vanderlaan. on the basis of Stanley 2 State
ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services" also presented a mother-father dispute
over custody of an illegitimate child. In deciding this case for the mother, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "the mother.., is the natural guardian
33 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 647, 654.
36 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
37 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).38 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
39 Perhaps the first step was taken in Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942):
Elihe real question we have to consider is . . . whether the wholesale condemna-
tion of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity to any
individual to show that his is not the type of case which would justify resort to it,
satisfies the demands of due process.
40 See also Weber v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
41 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
42 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
43 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
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of her illegitimate child and, therefore, has a legal right to its custody, care and
control, superior to that of the father....", This decision was vacated ex-
plicitly on the basis of Stanley."
The Court has treated Stanley as affecting the sexual as well as the illegiti-
macy stereotype. There is as much evidence showing the limitations of the one as
there is of the other. Just as it is unfair to assume that the child is better off
under the supervision of the state than under the supervision of the father, so it
is unfair to assume that the child is better off under the supervision of the mother
than under the father. Assumptions simply have no place here.
It would be unjust for the law not to recognize the burdens placed upon a
mother who is refused a legal abortion. The initial, but rebuttable, presumption
in favor of the mother's claims suggested in the first part of this commentary at-
tempts to insure full cognizance of her burdens. But, by the same token, it
would be ironic to forbid suspension of the father's driver's license without a
hearing," forbid discontinuance of his welfare checks without a hearing,47 or
forbid his expulsion from college without a hearing,"' and yet deprive him of a
son or daughter without a hearing.
The scope of neither Roe nor Stanley has been properly assessed by lower
courts or secondary literature. Roe may well impose fewer restrictions upon the
rights of the father than it has been taken to suggest, and Stanley may say more
about the rights of the father than has been recognized. There is no equivalent in
Stanley to Roe's footnote 67, explicitly limiting its decision and reserving the
question of the consonance of the right established in that case with the rights of
the cocreator of the child. In a word, Stanley established and Roe did not dis-
establish a right of the father.
IV. Due Process: Notice and Hearing for the Prospective Father
Roe v. Wade led one writer to make the following observation:
[G]ranting a man the power to force someone to carry and care for his child
despite her unwillingness to use her body and life for that purpose would
raise the spectre of the legally enforced physical and psychological domina-
tion of one group in society by another. A woman in contemporary America
who is coerced into submitting herself, at the insistence of man empowered
by law to control her choice, to the pains and anxieties of carrying, delivering
and nurturing a child she did not wish to conceive and does not want to bear
and raise, is entitled to believe that more than a play on words has come
to link her forced labor with the concept of involuntary servitude .... "
44 Id. at 422, 178 N.W.2d at 57.
45 Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
46 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
47 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In fact, the Court split, holding by a
vote of 6-3 that the hearing was not essential.
48 Dixon v. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
49 Tribe, supra note 5, at 40. Similarly:
Requiring the father's signature on the consent form would allow too many possi-
bilities for the woman to be ripped off .... We feel that forcing a woman to remain
pregnant against her will is a form of involuntary servitude; and therefore not to
be condoned under any circumstances ....
Letter to the author from Chris Cunningham, Member, NOW Right to Choose Coalition, Aug.
7, 1974.
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Nothing in Roe or in Stanley nor anything else in the law shows any error in that
statement °.5  However, admitting all this, argument here simply calls for a
balancing hearing.
Admittedly, there may well be a number of legitimate objections to the pro-
posed hearing requirement. First, there is the procedural problem of time. The
human gestation period is approximately 280 days. It is only during the first 90,
as the Court recognized in Roe, that an abortion is a very minor operation. Dur-
ing the second trimester, the danger of the operation substantially increases; an
abortion performed in the third trimester is a major and potentially dangerous
procedure. In other words, the abortion decision must be made quickly; it cannot
tolerate the delay normally accompanying full judicial procedures.
Second, there is the problem of enforcement. If a hearing board were to
rule for the father and if, nevertheless, the mother were to terminate the pregnancy
illegally, a remedy or punishment would have to be fashioned. Fine and im-
prisonment may or may not be appropriate. And if nothing can realistically be
done, does this not mean that the law would be better advised to avoid any in-
volvement in the matter?
Finally, there is the major substantive objection: what interests are to
be balanced by the hearing board and how are they to be balanced? More
specifically, what claim of the father could possibly be found to outweigh the
burdens on the unwilling mother?5 1
A closer look at each of these objections will be helpful. First, as to the
problem of time, despite the commonly held belief in the inevitability of intermi-
nable legal delay, the fact is that the law can move remarkably quickly when it
needs to. 2 Furthermore, there are already indications that the law recognizes
that this area would be one requiring quick action. A time-consuming series
of court cases-with its attendant selection of jurors, arguments of attorneys,
cross-examinations, etc.-is neither desirable nor necessary. The need is for an
immediate hearing. Usually the woman is able to recognize pregnancy within the
first 30 days following conception.5 That leaves approximately two months
remaining in the first trimester for the notification of the father, and the decision
of the hearing board.
50 A number of state statutes exhibit such male "domination." See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (i) (Cum. Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22 (Supp.
1974) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Cum. Supp. 1961). The North Carolina provisions were
repealed in 1973. The Colorado law was allowed to stand in People v. Norton, 507 P.2d 862(Colo. 1973), which struck down other parts of the Colorado Code dealing with abortion.
The Florida rules were held unconstitutional in Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla.
1974).
51 This objection is raised in letters to the writer from Prof. Thomas Emerson of the Yale
Law School, July 16, 1974, Beatrice Blair, Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights
League, July 10, 1974, and Arvonne S. Fraser, President of the Women's Equity Action League,
July 3, 1974.
52 E.g., the legal proceedings in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579(1952): From the time of placing the case on the docket of the district court to the time of
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 days elapsed. See generally A. WEsnx, THE ANAT-
OMY OF A CoNsTTUTIoNAL LAW CASE (1958).
53 State ex. rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 422. 178 N.W.2d 56, 57
(1970) (Hanley, J., concurring).
54 N. LEE, THE SEARcH FOR AN ABORTONIST 56 (1969); J. CHAPMAN, THE FEMALE
MIND AND BODY 228 (1967).
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Notice should not be permitted to take too much time. As one writer noted
in considering the time problem created by Stanley:
To minimize delay in the adoption process the time for responding [to
notice of intention to put up for adoption] should be as short as due process
will allow-five or ten days.... [Fjathers who do not promptly respond
cannot complain .... 55
That concern and that proposal seem no less valid with regard to abortions.
Indeed, Stanley only requires notice to the father who has come forward and
identified himself. Furthermore, mere published notice seems to satisfy Stanley.
Absent any showing of bad faith56 on the part of the mother, these rules would be
reasonable guidelines in the hearing procedure proposed here.
Perhaps not even this much should be required. If the father is not vitally
concerned with his child, he should not be allowed to veto the mother's decision
to abort. Absent any showing of bad faith, perhaps there should be no require-
ment of notice of intent at all. s
The second objection to be examined concerns the problem of enforcement.
Should and could a woman be punished for her defiance of a decision of a hear-
ing board? And if she could not, have we not made a solemn mockery of the
whole matter? 8
First, it is not so certain that there would be large-scale defiance of the
board's decisions. Though no more than suggestive, it is interesting to consider
the Scandinavian figures which showed that 84 percent of legal abortions would
have gone on to delivery had they been refused; of those actually refused in
Norway and Sweden 86 percent did go on to deliver.59 This source continues:
A more recent London study gives the smaller figure of 59 percent delivery.
... Among those refused the number known to have turned to an illegal
abortion are 20 percent in London and 9 percent and 11 percent in
Scandinavia. It is interesting to note that in the last mentioned series 30
percent said they would seek illegal abortions if refused, almost two-thirds
changed their minds .... While suicide is ... the great fear in refused abor-
tions, in N.Y. City . . . the incidence of suicide is eleven times commoner
among women in general than among the pregnant .... There is a world of
difference between threat of suicide and commission of suicide.60
In other words, many people will obey laws despite even vehement personal
opposition.
Yet, even if this were not the case, it is not clear that substantial problems
of compliance and enforcement establish a legitimate basis for denying constitu-
55 Comment, supra note 30, at 136 n.105; see also Note, Plight of the Putative Father in
California Child Custody Proceedings: A Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U. CALIF. DAVIS L.
Rv. 1, 17 (1973).
56 See N. LEE, supra note 54, at 49.
57 Note that this is possibly suggested in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
58 Means, supra note 30, at 492.
59 R. GARDNER, ABORTION: THE PERSONAL DILEMMA 223 (1972); see also J. BRUDENELL,
OnSTETRmS 67 (1964); D. C.ANFIELD, THE ABORTION DECISION 106 (1969); N. LEE, supra
note 54; Ely, supra note 5, at 923 n.26.
60 R. GARDNER, supra note 59, at 223-25.
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tional rights. Despite any noncompliance and nonenforcement in the area of
civil rights law since 1954, few would argue that courts were, therefore, wrong
in seeking to protect individuals' rights. Few would argue that Brown v. Board of
Education6 was wrong because of the depth of feeling of its opponents.62 If the
father does have constitutionally protected rights in a dispute regarding a
proposed abortion, admitted problems of enforcement cannot validly be raised to
vitiate those rights.
The major objection to providing a hearing procedure is the burden upon
the mother and upon her claim of right. As to the burden of pregnancy and
delivery, the chief medical finding seems to be that this is a subject simply not
conducive to generalizations, for the degree of hardship varies immensely with
each individual woman. 3 The findings suggest further, however, that it is the
nervous, angry, resentful pregnant woman who is most likely to have a difficult
pregnancy."' Not only is she the mother most likely to have a difficult pregnancy,
she is also the one most likely to deal with the situation through violence towards
herself or towards the fetus."5 Even if her anger and resentment do not lead her
to take violent action, there is some medical data to suggest that her strong angry
feelings implant themselves on the health and the disposition of the fetus., For
this woman there must seem to be a world of difference between bearing a child
because of force of circumstance and bearing a child because of force of law;
and that vast and unhappy difference is likely to affect all parties involved, in-
cluding the unborn child.
A hearing board should know all of these factors in reaching its decisions.
Still, there may be countervailing factors as well. Fathers need not be dis-
interested in and unconcerned about having children. The mother's desire to
abort may be matched by an even stronger paternal desire for a child. While in
some instances, the continuation of an unwanted pregnancy places heavy burdens
on the mother, in other instances, the medical findings indicate this may simply
not be the case. Indeed, it may be possible for the father to advance arguments
in opposition to an abortion based upon danger to his health.
Not only are there fathers whose mental health would be strongly affected by
the abortion, but there are also some fathers who so want to have children that
61 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62 There are similar problems in other areas of the law. Should enforcement problems
lead us, for instance, to repeal our laws against perjury or obscene phone calls (to cite just
two areas of the law where there is flagrant defiance and little enforcement) ? Is the fact that
the law cannot do everything in some areas good reason for the law to refrain from trying to do
anything in those areas? Note Justice Holmes' response to that question in Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
Note also that the problem here is distinct from and less difficult than the problem of
enforcing penalties against "victimless crimes." See generally E. ScHuR, CRJMES WITHOUT
Vicrims (1965). For here there is a clear, complaining victim: the father.
63 See Curran, Equal Protection of the Law: Pregnant School Teachers, 285 N.E.J. MED.
336 (1971).
64 See J. BRUDENELL, supra note 59, at 38, 54; J. CHAPMAN, supra note 54, at 231.
65 But cf. the data at note 60 supra.
66 Note the interchange between Dr. Huthsteiner (neuropsychiatrist), Miss Joselyn (adop-
tion caseworker) and Dr. Aaron (psychiatrist, obstetrician and gynecologist in ABORTION:
LEGAL AND ILLEGAL 40-41 (F. Kummer ed. 1967); cf., Caplan, The Disturbance of the
Mother-Child Relationship by Unsuccessful Attempts at Abortion, 38 MENTAL HYGIMNE 67
(1954). See also J. CHAPMAN, supra note 54, at 243.
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they are prepared to take on all parental responsibilities.67 If such fathers do
exist, should the law not take cognizance of their concerns as well as the mothers'?
The author who made the observation concerning involuntary servitude went on
to point out:
Quite a different argument would be presented if the prospective father Was
truly to undertake the burdens of parenthood himself rather than expecting
the unwilling mother to bear all or most of those burdens. In such a case
the state might want to confer a veto over abortion on the theory that the
man's right to raise his own child is important enough to justify the burdens
of coerced pregnancy for the woman.68
In such situations there may be justice in balancing the woman's right, based
upon whether the abortion is sought to save her life or simply for convenience.69
V. Roe versus Stanley
While there has not yet been a case involving the theoretical conflict
between Roe and Stanley there have been parallel mother-father disputes in the
law which may be helpful to this analysis. The first relevant principle found in
the common law is that the husband as well as the wife has legal interests in the
offspring. Secondly, the father, if another man is married to the mother, has no
legal interest in the offspring."0 Moreover, whatever legal interests either the
husband or father has in some matters concerning the offspring, he traditionally
has no legal right with regard to the decision whether or not the fetus should be
aborted.7 '
However, the uniformity of these views is merely a recognition of and re-
sponse to certain pervasive societal assumptions. The unquestioned different life
roles of men and women-perhaps suggested by the different penalties which
Adam and Eve had to pay for eating the forbidden fruit 2 -had the support of
social structure, biblical teaching, and even the law. In the words of the Su-
preme Court:
67 See Jordan & Little, Early Comments on Single-Parent Adoptive Homes, 45 CHILD
WELFARE J. 536. All of these single-parent adoptions had been to lone women and were
considered "successful" by the agency. Since the time of that writing, a number of men made
single-parent adoptions, all of which were also considered "successful." Telephone conversa-
tion between this writer and Velma Jones, District Case Director of the Los Angeles County
Bureau of Adoptions. See, also the single-parent adoption of Dojo and Kwame Odo noted in
11 Ms. 55 (May, 1974).
68 Tribe, supra note 5, at 40. See Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt
to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 722:
Because the maternal function is so basic to the female biological-cultural role,
penalizing the fulfilling of that role seems an undeniable discrimination, at least where
men are not similarly required to surrender part of their basic cultural role. (Empha-
sis added.)
69 This latter possibility is raised and evaluated in Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1
PHILOSOPHY & PuB. AFFAms 47 (1971), and is labelled as "positively indecent." Id. at 65-66.
The point is, of course, that in following an "across the board" approach, courts deciding
mother-father abortion disputes must sanction an abortion desired for even this reason.
70 Comment, supra note 30, at 116; Note, supra note 55, at 1.
71 Means, supra note 30, at 34. But see note 50 supra and accompanying text.
72 That is, apparently God's intent is to punish Adam and Eve severely, in a way central
to their existence. Adam is cursed to the pain of gathering subsistence only through great toil
and effort. Eve is cursed to the pain of childbirth. Genesis 3:16-19.
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[L]aw, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in
the-Tespective spheres and destinies of man and woman.... The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as
well as the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. . . .The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
office of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
7 3
This is the traditional view, the stereotype reinforced by both the civil and
common law. However, in the last several decades, such thinking has increasingly
been challenged and, particularly in the last five years, these challenges have
become successful. Despite women's "natural delicacy,"7 4 a federal district court
ruled in 1969 that it was an error for the trial judge summarily to forbid consider-
ation of women for service on a jury which was being empanelled to hear a
malpractice suit involving cancer of the groin." Despite long-standing traditions,
laws automatically preferring men over women as disposers of estates, 6 certain
regulations based on the assumption that men are the financial supporters of
their families,7 laws barring women from particular occupations open to men, 8
laws requiring job-leave for pregnant women,' as well as other protective lawss
have all failed to pass constitutional scrutiny.
Although not so consistently, men also have had success in overcoming the
sexual stereotype. For example, it is now possible for widowers to receive benefits
under the Social Security Act."' The view that fathers cannot be and do not
want to be vitally concerned with the upbringing of their children was laid
partially to rest with official recognition of a father's claim for a child-rearing
leave.8" The prejudice that fathers cannot care for their infant children was
set aside in three instances where placement of the infant with the unwed father
was preferred to placement with the state,83 placement with maternal relatives,84
or placement with a promiscuous mother.8 5 Even the view that fathers have no
place in deciding upon abortions has been questioned: A husband was permitted
to bring a civil action against an illegal abortionist because of the husband's
73 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 141.
75 Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969).
76 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
77 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
78 See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
79 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
80 See Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1973).
81 Rosen, Widower Wins: Benefits for Men, Civil Liberties (Newsletter of the American
Civil Liberties Union), March, 1974, at 4, cols. 1-4.
82 Id.
83 Reported in Young GI's Victory--Custody of Son, San Francisco Chronicle, March 8,
1973, at 1, col. 1.
84 In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731 (1963).
85 Fee v. Fee, 11 Mich. App. 593, 162 N.W.2d 95 (1968); Morrissey v. Morrissey, 182
Neb. 268, 154 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
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marital and paternal interests, 6 despite the fact that the wife had consented to
the abortion.
This lower court activity, however, constitutes but a chipping away at the
edges. The basic rule remains: "Of course, the rule must be that the abortion
decision must be the woman's decision-the man has no place here."8 " The
continued strength of this view can be seen in Coe v. Gerstein8 and Jones v.
Smdth. s9 In these two recent cases, fathers sought to prevent abortions. In both
cases the fathers lost since the court assumed an almost absolute right of privacy
to the woman 0 and operated from the unarticulated premise that fathers could
not have substantial interests in preventing abortions. They reasoned that even
if such interests existed, Roe forbade the state from enforcing them at least until
viability,91 and acted as if Roe's footnote 67 scarcely existed.
A closer look at the facts of Jones more clearly focuses this unarticulated
premise. Mr. Jones, 27 years old and the admitted father, wished to marry Miss
Smith and take on all obligations toward the unborn child. She did not, how-
ever, wish to marry Mr. Jones or bear the child.
Mr. Jones claimed that the abortion would deny him the companionship of
his son or daughter and, further, that the abortion would be disastrous to his
mental health. He presented a psychiatrist who testified supporting his claim.
Miss Smith presented no psychiatrist to rebut that testimony, nor did she raise
any claim about her own health, either mental or physicalV2 The three-judge
court, relying on an arguably erroneous reading of Roe, unanimously held for
Miss Smith.
This exclusivity of the mother's decision and total disregard for the claims
of the father is a fundamentally sexist expression. It is this sexist language which
belies new realities. In some families, as one study observes: "Husbands and
wives are joint homemakers and joint wage earners. Men care for babies,
women manage family finances .... [M]any husbands wish to attend ante-natal
classes with their wives, and take a keen interest in the physiology of pregnancy.'
Such a husband as this, continues another source, "is no longer an outsider but
rather part of a team, which does seem to entitle him to follow the entire proce-
dure through from beginning to end."94 Thus far, the courts have not acknowl-
edged this expanded male role.
However, the most recent decision may signal the beginning of a change.
86 Touriel v. Benveniste, Civ. No. 766790 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Oct. 20,
1961). See also 14 STAN. L. REv. 901 (1962); 110 U. PA. L. Rnv. 908 (1962). Cf. Mc-
Candless v. New York, 3 App. Div. 2d 600, 162 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1957); Herko v. Uviller, 203
Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1952).
87 Means, supra note 30, at 428-29.
88 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
89 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
90 Id. at 341-42.
91 376 F. Supp. at 697-98.
92 Cf. Murray v. VanDevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). Here the Okla-
homa court held for the physician in performing the medically advisable hysterectomy, which
had the wife's consent, but not the husband's. The husband strongly opposed the operation,
since it would mean that his wife could no longer bear a child. Because of the medical con-
siderations, the case was probably decided correctly.
93 P. FLE mY, MATERNrrY CARE: MOTHER'S EXPERIENCES OF CHILDBIRTH 93-94 (1967).
94 S. DELEE, supra note 74, at 35.
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Doe v. Doe' was decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on July
3, 1974. Mr. Doe, arguing for the companionship of his child, sought to prevent
his wife's abortion. He was defeated by the same misreading of Roe's footnote
67, the same disregard of Stanley, and the same disregard of changing social
roles, which had defeated Mr. Coe and Mr. Jones. The difference in Doe v. Doe,
is that, for the first time on this subject, the court was not unanimous.
While agreeing with the court's decision not to prevent the abortion, Judge
Hennessey in his dissent in part, asserts that the father does indeed have funda-
mental rights and that Roe did not strip away those rights. In a separate dissent,
Judge Reardon asserts that the Roe privacy is not absolute and must be weighed
against other interests. He acknowledges the fact that a particular father may
have such a compelling interest, sees Roe as not altering this since it dealt with
the interests of the state rather than of the father, deplores the lack of legislative
guidelines to help judges in balancing the interests of the father and the mother,
and recognizes the obligation of courts to undertake that delicate balancing.
Judge Reardon's dissent correctly reads the law and relevant social changes and,
at last, judicially recognizes the rights of the father.8
VI. Conclusion
The proper goal must be not to give women a better status within the tra-
ditional stereotype but to shatter the stereotype. Stanley was not merely a victory
for men's rights, nor were Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson merely
victories for women; all three were victories for individuals whose rights should
not be a function of sex. Professor Kanowitz has recognized that fathers, too,
are victimized by sexism:
In thousands of ways, in law, social mores, employment pattern, and
psychological health, males are victims, along with women, of a system that
arbitrarily assigns roles on the basis of sex.... [M]any people now see the
issue as one of a more rational and humane allocation of social roles without
regard to sex rather than one as simply involving women's rights.97
This commentary expresses the hope that our courts will recognize this expansion
of the battle for equal rights and will accordingly allocate legal protection to
fathers.
95 - Mass. -, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974).
96 In a telephone conversation with Mr. Mark I. Benson, Mr. Doe's attorney, the author
was told that no appeal of the case was planned. Judge Reardon's position will have to await
another case for vindication.
97 KANowrrz, The Male Stake in Women's Liberation, CALIF. W. L. Rav. 424, 427
(1972). This view has been expressed by many leaders of the women's rights movement. E.g.,
"The first significant discovery we shall make as we racket along our female road to freedom
is that men are not free. . . ." G. G.EER, THn FEMALE EUNUCH 328 (1971). "What I am
trying to say is, please don't use any differences in biology or physiology to prevent me from
doing the things I can do." Testimony of Jean Faust, Legislative Assistant to Representative
William Fitz Ryan, Hearings on H.R. 208 before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, at 103 (1971). See also B. JONES & J. BROWN, TowARDS A
FEmALE, LmERATION MOVEMENT 2 (no date); Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common
Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 1033 (1972).
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